The author critiques a Denník N article arguing Russia expands militarily due to an inability to modernize, calling it a flawed thesis. The article’s five key claims are substantively incorrect: the Soviet Union/Russia did achieve significant, albeit costly, industrialization; historical Russian/Soviet expansion parallels other empires and was ideologically, not economically, driven; the 2008 Georgia war did not involve Russia „seizing“ part of the country; Russia’s 2022 invasion aims at specific regions and not subjugating all of Ukraine and reflects Russian fears from NATO expansion; and in contrast to authors’s thesis, Russian leadership has denied plans to attack other European states. The critique advocates for more rigorous, evidence-based geopolitical discourse in media.
A deeply contentious geopolitical thesis, which I argue is fundamentally incorrect, has been introduced into Slovak public discourse by two authors in the pages of Denník N: “We can ask why Russia actually cannot simply settle down within its own borders. The answer is that it has long been unable to launch its economic and social modernization, yet despite this, it still insists that it is a superpower“.
This thesis rests on arguments that merit closer examination, while the supporting factual evidence appears limited. While it is standard that media commentaries do not provide extensive evidence, this makes it all the more important for authors to engage with the debate substantively.
This expectation is particularly relevant given that both authors present themselves as experts in this field. Professor Jozef Bátora has impressive C.V. (https://dennikn.sk/autor/jozef-batora/).
Similarly, Norvegian co-author Iver B. Neumann is a political scientist, social anthropologist, and university lecturer. He heads the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo (https://dennikn.sk/autor/iver-b-neumann/).
The Fridtjof Nansen Institute is an independent Norwegian research foundation. The institute specialises in international environmental, climate and energy policy, biodiversity, the law of the sea and the Arctic, with particular expertise on Norwegian governance, EU, China and Russia. (https://www.fni.no/)
Why is this thesis problematic? There are several substantive concerns that require critical analysis. Before examining these issues, it is essential to acknowledge that the current geopolitical climate demands particularly rigorous and evidence-based public engagement with sensitive topics. Certain claims presented by the authors have the potential to fuel unnecessary public apprehension. Furthermore, the core assertion seems to stem from a broader, and dangerously misconceived, understanding of the geopolitical dynamics of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, a misconception that is not confined to Slovakia alone. It is reasonable to expect that a prestigious newspaper, especially one targeting educated elites, would guarantee substantive and rigorous geopolitical discourse.
The following section examines five of the most problematic claims presented in the article titled „Zápas o Európu je bojom medzi európskym a ruským modelom vládnutia“ [The struggle for Europe is a battle between the European and Russian models of governance], published in Denník N on December 25, 2025 (https://dennikn.sk/5043596/zapas-o-europu-je-bojom-medzi-europskym-a-ruskym-modelom-vladnutia/).
Problematic Claim No. 1
The first problematic claim concerns the following statement:„Since Russia is traditionally not capable of growing through modernizing its economy and society, it has long been growing territorially-expansively through the use of military force and subjugating foreign territories.”
Evidence: Smirnov, S. (2015). Economic Fluctuations in Russia (from the late 1920s to 2015). Russian Journal of Economics 1(2): 130-153. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ruje.2015.11.002).
Yet it is likely that less brutal economic transformation could be ultimately even more productive Evidence: Zhuravskaya, E., Guriev, S., & Markevich, A. (2024). New Russian economic history. Journal of Economic Literature, 62(1), 47-114. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221564).
Nonetheles, in relative terms, the Soviet Union grew in parallel to the USA until the early 1970s. The Soviet Union began to stagnate and fell behind during the last two decades before its collapse, in 1991.
Evidence: Zhuravskaya, E., Guriev, S., & Markevich, A. (2024). New Russian economic history. Journal of Economic Literature, 62(1), 47-114. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221564)
However, subjugating foreign territories was more an ideological project than an economic project. For example, the CIA estimated the total costs of the Soviet Union’s aid to communist countries at 23 billion US dollars, or 1.5 percent of GNP just in the 1980 year.
Evidence: CIA, 1981, ER 81-10229.
Thus, a connection between foreign expansion (which was limited at that time) and economic growth can hardly be seen. In fact, there appears to be a negative burden from this expansion.
If we look at recent decades, we also see primarily economic growth in Russia. Interestingly, there was especially strong GDP growth just before the invasion.
Evidence: https://www.macrotrends.net/datasets/global-metrics/countries/rus/russia/gdp-growth-rate
Problematic Claim No. 2
The second problematic claim concerns the following statement:“This is how tsarist Russia was created and this is also how the Soviet Union was created.”
Well, although it is true that tsarist Russia (and partly the Soviet Union) was created through territorial expansion and the use of force, this approach was not different from that of other major European colonial empires—be it British, French, Dutch, Portuguese or Spanish empires. Ironically, though, some of these aforementioned empires managed to create thriving economies (the Netherlands, the UK), while some of them did not. Actually, in some cases, in the long term, their territorial expansion seemed to be counterproductive in that regard (Spain, Portugal). Thus, this relationship does not seem to be unique to the case of Russia. More importantly, as mentioned, Russia or the Soviet Union managed to produce some economic growth—thus, later military expansion was usually an additional economic burden, motivated by ideological or geopolitical reasons (during communism).
For example, even the invasion of Afghanistan was definitely not motivated by economic gains, and the decision to invade was made rather reluctantly.
Evidence: Gandomi, J. (2008). Lessons from the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan for the United States and NATO. Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs; Alimi, A. (2025). Beyond Empire: Why the Soviet invasion (and withdrawal) of Afghanistan was different. Middle East Critique, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2025.2499294).
Problematic Claim No. 3
The third problematic claim concerns the following statement:“This also applies to the era of Vladimir Putin. Russia in 2008 seized part of Georgia,….”
Well, this is an extreme simplification and a fundamentally incorrect statement. Russia did not seize part of Georgia in 2008. South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been de facto independent entities since the early 1990s. Russia recognized their independence de iure after the invasion of Georgia in 2008.A critical historical point is that the full-scale military offensive was initiated following Georgia’s declaration of a ceasefire. This move was timed to the opening of the Olympic Games and represented a direct violation of the binding Sochi Agreement, to which Georgia was a signatory.
Sure, both South Ossetia and Abkhazia are heavily dependent on Russia. Actually, South Ossetia asked Russia for recognition of idependence even before that invasion, but Russia refused to do so at that time. A planned referendum on integration of South Ossetia with Russia, scheduled for 2022, did not materialize.
Evidence: There is an abundance of evidence on the matter; however, some claims within it are either wholly incorrect or contain significant inaccuracies. Check e.g. Zanatta, L. (2025). Rethinking the problem of agency in the “borderization” of Georgia (Policy Brief No. 98). OSCE Academy in Bishkek. https://www.osce-academy.net/
Problematic Claim No. 4
The fourth problematic claim concerns the following statement:“In 2022, it decided to subjugate all of Ukraine and unleashed the largest conventional war in Europe since the Second World War. “
Russia has never expressed its intention to subjugate all of Ukraine. Territorially, it has a primary interest in the Donbas with its Russian-speaking population, and in Crimea (with its naval bases as well as its Russian-speaking population). Moreover, expansion into the Donbas is not motivated by territory expansion or with the aim to aid the Russian economy (nor was the annexation of Crimea, as explained above).
The primary strategic anxiety for Russia, in fact, is the prospect of NATO’s eastward expansion into Ukraine. This may be seen as irrational fear by some, and/or as ignoring Ukraine’s wishes, but that is a fact.
Evidence: Speech and answers to questions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov at the XI All-Russian Youth Educational Forum “Territory of Meanings”, Solnechnogorsk, July 28, 2025, 28.07.2025 19:21, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2038315/
Problematic Claim No. 5
The fifth problematic claim concerns the following statement:“At the beginning of December 2025, Putin declared that Russia is prepared to undertake direct military actions also against other European states.“
On the contrary, President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov have repeatedly stated that Russia has no intentions to attack Europe, but they are ready to respond, if Europe does so first. Putin called this idea nonsensical from a military perspective.
The dissemination of such an alarmist and factually flawed statement is irresponsible under any circumstances and is rendered especially tone-deaf by its timing during the Christmas season.
Evidence: Reuters, Dmitry Antonov, December 9, 2025, Putin does not want to restore the U.S.S.R. or attack NATO, the Kremlin says, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/putin-does-not-want-restore-ussr-or-attack-nato-kremlin-says-2025-12-09/
Conclusion
This blog is not intended as a defense of Russia. Its purpose is to advocate for a rational, logical, and fact-based discourse on geopolitics—a standard that should be upheld by academic and media analysis when addressing critical contemporary issues.
When even trained academics produce fundamentally flawed perspectives on these matters, it is unsurprising that similar deficiencies permeate discourse among the general public and within professional diplomatic circles.
Both the authors and the newspaper’s editors have been notified of the substantive deficiencies in the published opinion piece, which was presented as a geopolitical analysis by purportedly highly knowledgeable individuals.
The author of this blog contribution does not claim to be an expert on geopolitics or on Russia. Therefore, he is willing to correct this text or add explanations by knowledgeable individuals, with the aim of contributing to a lively but rational debate on fundamental issues.
The text was written in English, as one of the criticized authors does not speak the local language; moreover, these issues are of wider importance than just local ones.